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U.S. SUPREME COURT:
ARBITRATION IS THE NEW EMPLOYMENT LAW
The
employment law component of the docket during the most recent term of the
U.S. Supreme Court was dominated by decisions on arbitration. Some of the
cases have the potential to affect large numbers of employers and employees.
Allocation
of Power
In
the most significant of these decisions, the Court determined the allocation
of decisionmaking powers under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), where an
agreement to arbitrate includes an “agreement within the agreement,”
delegating to the arbitrator the power to determine the enforceability of
the arbitration agreement.
If
a party specifically challenges the enforceability of that particular
“delegation” agreement, the district court considers the challenge before
ordering compliance with the agreement. However, if a party challenges the
enforceability of the agreement as a whole, such as by a contention that it
is unconscionable, as in the case before the Court, that challenge is for
the arbitrator. In other words, in the latter situation, the courts must
give effect to the agreement according to the terms agreed upon by the
parties, by putting the matter before the arbitrator.
This is in keeping with the FAA’s general rule that agreements to arbitrate
“shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” The Court
also relied on its previous recognition that parties can agree to arbitrate
“gateway” questions of “arbitrability,” such as whether the parties have
agreed to arbitrate in the first place, or whether their agreement covers a
particular controversy.
Contract
Formation
All was not lost for those predisposed to have courts, not arbitrators,
decide as many employer‑employee disputes as possible. In another case, an
employer sued an international union and a local union, alleging that the
local’s strike breached a no‑strike clause in a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA). The employer also alleged that the international union had
engaged in tortious interference with a contract by promoting the strike and
that both defendants were liable for claims under the federal Labor
Management Relations Act.
Resolution of the claims against the unions was affected by a dispute over
the ratification date of the CBA, which contained an arbitration clause. The
Court ruled that the dispute was a matter to be resolved by the federal
district court, rather than by an arbitrator. The argument over the
formation or existence date fell outside the scope of the arbitration
clause, which was limited to claims “arising under” the CBA. The Court
applied the prevailing general rule that where the matter at issue concerns
contract formation, such a dispute is generally for the courts to decide. In
addition, a court may order arbitration of a particular dispute only where
the court is satisfied, as it was not in the case before the Court, that the
parties had agreed to arbitrate that dispute.
Class‑Action Arbitration
In
another case, the Court was concerned with when parties can be made to
submit to arbitration for an entire class of claims, and its answer was, in
short, not unless they clearly consent to it. There are fundamental
differences between the more typical bilateral arbitration and class‑action
arbitration. In the latter case, an arbitrator chosen according to an
agreed‑upon procedure no longer resolves a single dispute between the
parties to one agreement but, instead, resolves many disputes between
hundreds or perhaps even thousands of parties.
The presumption of privacy and confidentiality that applies in many
bilateral arbitrations does not apply in class arbitrations, thus
potentially frustrating the parties’ assumptions when they first agreed to
arbitrate. The arbitrator’s award no longer purports to bind just the
parties to a single arbitration agreement but adjudicates the rights of
absent parties as well.
The commercial stakes of class‑action arbitration are comparable to those of
class‑action litigation, even though the scope of judicial review is much
more limited. In a case involving antitrust allegations against shipping
companies by some of their customers, these differences between bilateral
arbitration and class‑action arbitration were too great for arbitrators to
presume that the parties’ mere silence on the issue of class‑action
arbitration constituted consent to resolve their disputes in class‑action
proceedings.
TAKING
LAND FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
A
city negotiated with property owners to acquire a strip of land and some
temporary easements for the purpose of installing a deceleration lane for
traffic that would access a new development. Included in that development
was a building to be occupied by a well‑known national retailer of consumer
goods. After initial negotiations to acquire the real property failed, the
city filed a petition in state court to condemn the property.
The owner of the property subject to being taken tried to capitalize on the
fact that the state legislature had recently subjected the power of eminent
domain to a new additional limitation. In 2006, after the U.S. Supreme Court
had determined in a controversial ruling that the transfer of land to a
third party for the purpose of furthering a city’s economic development plan
was a sufficiently public use to permit the constitutional exercise of
eminent domain, the legislature passed a new law to prohibit the use of
eminent domain “if the taking is primarily for an economic development
purpose.”
The property owner argued that the deceleration lane primarily served the
economic development purpose of providing vehicles access to the nearby
retailer. He reasoned further that the addition of the deceleration lane
would ultimately cause the expansion of the city’s property and sales tax
bases by providing the retailer’s customers easier access to the retailer’s
parking lot.
A
state appellate court upheld the taking. Although the collateral
consequences of the addition of a deceleration lane might include some
enhancement to economic development, the primary purpose of the new lane
clearly was the same as for any other road project— simply to promote
traffic safety and the efficient flow of traffic on the city’s streets. The
court acknowledged that many permissible uses of eminent domain provide
collateral benefits to private industry. When land is acquired by eminent
domain for a public building, such as a school, nearby convenience stores or
restaurants may also benefit. Using eminent domain to install utilities
likewise can be beneficial to surrounding businesses. There are countless
other instances where the exercise of eminent domain indirectly enhances
economic development, but such situations do not come within the newly
enacted prohibitions on the use of condemnation by the government, because
such takings do not have as their primary purpose the stimulation of
economic development.
Four reasons offered by the court for upholding the condemnation provide
some criteria for gauging whether any other such challenges by property
owners have a chance of succeeding on a similar theory: First, the city did
not take the property primarily for the “use” of a commercial enterprise in
any traditional sense. The city will be the owner of title to the land, and
the primary users will be members of the public at large.
Second, the city’s acquisition of the real property did not serve the
primary purpose of increasing tax revenue because the actual land acquired
will not contain any entity that will generate sales or property taxes.
Third, the city’s acquisition of the land was not primarily serving the
purpose of increasing employment. Construction of the deceleration lane will
require the temporary use of labor, but the purpose of a deceleration lane
is unrelated to the creation of additional jobs, as opposed to traffic
control.
Finally, the use of the property cannot be construed as primarily related to
general economic conditions, because there was no evidence that this
affected the city’s determination to exercise its eminent domain powers. The
decisionmaking body, the city’s engineering department, acquired the
property at issue to allow traffic to proceed in an orderly and efficient
fashion and to limit the potential collisions as a result of cars
decelerating on the right‑of‑way. There also was no evidence that the nearby
retailer in some way used economic pressure to convince the city to install
the deceleration lane.
BANK
ACCOUNTS ARE A‑CHANGING
In
the last year, new Federal Reserve Board rules have reined in the ability of
banks and other financial institutions to impose charges and fees for some
of their services. Issuers of credit cards generally cannot increase the
interest rate on a card for one year after the account is opened. Consumers
will no longer be charged a fee when a transaction causes an account to
exceed its credit limit, unless the consumer has agreed in advance. For
“subprime” cards, held by those with a limited or bad credit history, the
total initial fees cannot exceed 25% of the card’s initial credit limit,
with the exception of fees for late payments, for exceeding the credit
limit, or for returned payments due to insufficient funds.
With these and other tightened regulations, it is predictable that financial
institutions will gravitate toward other means of enhancing revenues through
new or increased fees, and with new or more demanding requirements placed on
consumers. In such a climate, consumers are well advised to brush up on some
strategies for minimizing the financial hits from the institutions:
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If your bank decides
to add or raise a minimum balance requirement for your account, consider
whether you would do just as well with a “no frills” account that would
have no such requirement, and likely no maintenance fee. The tradeoff
may be a monthly limit on the number of checks that you can write, or on
the number of ATM or debit‑card transactions.
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The return from
interest‑bearing accounts today is barely an improvement on keeping your
money under the mattress. It might be smarter to use a free account that
pays no or very little interest, instead of an account that pays a
slightly higher interest rate but also comes with a monthly fee. The
monthly fee could well be greater than the meager return on the
interest‑bearing account.
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It is not exactly
riveting reading material for most people, but make yourself promptly
check your accounts online or check your paper account statements for
errors, or for fees or account changes you may not have been expecting.
In the same vein, monitoring the activity on your debit or ATM card will
help you promptly report a problem if the card is lost or stolen,
thereby limiting your liability.
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Many banks offer a
free “alert service,” meaning that the bank will send you an e‑mail or
text message notifying you when there has been a significant transaction
on your account or if your balance drops below a certain threshold. Such
a “heads up” could allow you to shift funds among your accounts to avoid
overdrawing an account.
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If overdrawing an
account is a recurring event, consider changing from overdraft coverage
to cheaper alternatives, such as linking a savings account to a checking
account, arranging for an overdraft line of credit, or, for a short‑term
shortage of cash, applying for a small loan.
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ATM fees may not be
crippling, but they can add up. Try to stick mainly with your own
institution’s ATMs, where there generally is no charge. If your bank
allows getting some cash back on a debit‑card transaction at no charge,
that is an alternative to an ATM for getting small amounts of cash.
SEASON TICKETS
CANNOT BE SEIZED
When a
taxpayer failed to pay his federal income taxes, the IRS issued a levy against
him. Among his possessions was a block of 16 season tickets for a professional
sports team. He also had paid a deposit per seat as a “personal seat license,”
on top of the cost each year for the season tickets themselves.
The
IRS wanted to seize and sell the season ticket renewal right, treating it as a
form of “property or rights to property” under federal law. The sports team
objected but did say that if it received a levy it would pay out the taxpayer’s
deposit for the personal seat licenses. The team’s policy provided that the
right to renew season tickets was not transferable and that if a ticket holder
did not renew, the tickets would pass to the next person on a very long waiting
list of people seeking season tickets.
In
issuing an Advisory Opinion in favor of the sports team’s position, the IRS
found no precedents on the precise issue, but it borrowed from bankruptcy cases
in which the bankruptcy trustee sold the taxpayer’s season ticket renewals as
property of the estate. In that context, the decisive factor was the team’s
policy—if the team treated a right to renew as transferable, it was “property,”
but if, as in the case at hand, it did not allow transfers, the right to renew
was not a property right that could be sold.
As a
result, the IRS could not touch the taxpayer’s right to renew his tickets to
satisfy the taxes owed, but it could go after the personal seat licenses for
which the taxpayer had paid a deposit. A tax lien would attach to them, putting
the IRS into the taxpayer’s shoes and allowing the IRS to terminate the season
tickets and receive a refund of the personal seat licenses deposit. The people
next in line on the waiting list were no doubt very pleased.
JUNK
FAX EXEMPTIONS
A
self‑styled “business‑to‑business media company” that publishes trade magazines
and sponsors industry‑specific trade shows sent a fax advertising a trade show
to a civil engineering and design firm. That simple act prompted a federal
lawsuit by the fax recipient. As the court put it, in this case, as in most
other junk fax cases, the facts were “not especially juicy.” The same design
firm had apparently adopted a combative policy regarding unsolicited
communications of this kind. According to the court, the firm had filed over 100
similar suits under the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).
The
design firm was among the more than five million subscribers to the media
company’s publications. Over a 10‑year period, it had subscribed to three of the
media company’s publications. For each subscription, the design firm’s president
and sole shareholder filled out the subscription card. On at least two of the
subscription cards, he provided the design firm’s fax number as part of the
required contact information.
The
single fax that set the lawsuit in motion had been sent to the attention of the
design firm’s president, using the fax number he had provided in his
subscription requests. In addition to information about the trade show, the fax
included a notice inviting the recipient to write “remove” on the face of the
advertisement and fax it back to a toll‑free number if he believed that he had
received the fax in error or if he wished to unsubscribe. Instead of accepting
that invitation, the design firm filed a class‑action lawsuit.
The
media company was able to fend off the lawsuit by establishing the “established
business relationship” (EBR) defense. In 2005—after the media company had sent
the fax, but before the design firm had filed suit—Congress passed the Junk Fax
Prevention Act (JFPA), which amended the TCPA to exempt from the ban on
unsolicited fax advertisements any faxes sent from a sender with an established
business relationship with the recipient.
Although the pre‑JFPA version of the TCPA applied in this case, even at that
earlier time the business relationship exemption appeared in FCC reports and
orders implementing the TCPA. An FCC 1992 Report and Order stated that a
“facsimile transmission from persons or entities who have an established
business relationship with the recipient can be deemed to be invited or
permitted by the recipient.”
The
plaintiff design firm tried without success to persuade the court that the EBR
defense, as laid out in FCC edicts, was meant to apply only to communications
with residential, not commercial, customers. It pointed to an FCC order using
language to that effect, but that order was limited to telephone solicitations
directed at residences and was geared toward preventing people from being
peppered with annoying solicitation calls in their homes. The provisions that
were specific to faxed advertisements did not confine the EBR defense to
residential customers, and it was therefore available in the case of the fax to
the design firm.
T
he
relationship between the recipient design firm, as subscriber, and the media
company, as publisher, fell well within the scope of the EBR defense under the
TCPA. Their relationship came under the broad definition used in the Act—a prior
existing relationship formed by voluntary two‑way communications, which
relationship had not previously been terminated by either party.

This newsletter is provided for informational purposes only. Receipt of this
newsletter does not constitute an attorney-client relationship. Consult with an
attorney for legal advice.

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